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GOOD OFFICES: GRASPING THE PLACE OF LAW IN CONFLICT 
 
Aoife O’Donoghue 
ABSTRACT 
 
Good offices is now a significant facet in the pantheon of methods open to participants in the 
pacific settlement of disputes. This has come about due to a number of significant operational 
changes over the past century. This includes, among other changes, a move away from state-
led good offices and an increased role in the practice for the heads of international 
organisations. This has led to a re-definition of good offices which stresses the actor carrying 
out the role rather than the form which it takes. Yet, this has not been accompanied by a 
change in the legal analysis or accompanying definitions of good offices. Bell’s lex 
pacificatoria may offer a template by which to understand the operation of good offices in 
the settlement of violent conflicts in the 21st Century. If good offices is to continue to have a 
significant role in conflict settlement a fully developed legal analysis is required. Bell’s lex 
proffers one potential mode of analysis for understanding good offices and the place of law in 
conflict. 
Keywords: good offices, lex pacificatoria, UN Secretary General, conflict resolution 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
An insufficiently studied practice, good offices remains a central feature of international 
dispute settlement. Attempts at defining good offices in treaty or other form has been limited 
and when undertaken usually result in describing what it is not rather than what it, in practice, 
entails.
1
 Similarly, doctrinal analysis has been sparse and where it has occurred it is often in 
the context of analysing a particular conflict or office holder.
2
 This obscures the potential 
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 See variously Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (adopted 1899), Convention for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (adopted 1907), Basic Documents, Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, The Hague & The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (adopted April 30 1948) 30 UNTS 55, 
601 
2
 Leon Gordenker, The UN Secretary General and the Maintenance of Peace (Colombia University Press, 1967) 
144, Thomas M Franck ‘The Secretary General’s Role in Conflict Resolution: Past Present and Pure Conjecture’ 
(1995) 6 EJIL 360, Alys Brehio, Good Offices of the Secretary General as Preventative Measures, (1998) 30 
NYUJ In & Pol 589, Benjamin G. Ramcharan, ‘The Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General in 
the Field of Human Rights’ (1982) 76 AJIL 130, K R Simmonds, ‘Good Offices and the Secretary General’ 
(1959) 29 Nordisk Tidsskrift International Relations 330, Thomas Fischer, ‘Switzerland’s Good Offices: A 
Changing Concept 1945-2002’ (Nr 37, Centre for International Studies, 2002) Report of the Secretary General, 
In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’ 2005, UN Doc. A/59/2005, 
William J Dixon, ‘Third-party Techniques for Preventing conflict escalation and promoting pacific settlement’ 
(1996) 50 International Organization 653, Francisco O. Vicuna, ‘New Dispute Settlement Procedures’ (1999) 31 
Studies in Transnational Legal Policy 59, Robert Probst, “Good Offices” in the light of Swiss international 
practice and experience (Martinus/Nijhoff, 1989), Benjamin G. Ramcharan, Humanitarian Good Offices in 
 
 
3 
 
strengths that lie behind good offices, most particularly its ability to develop and evolve 
alongside a particular dispute that ensures the sensitivity requires to resolve conflicts is the 
guide to its operation. Yet, the dearth in legal analysis leaves little guidance for those who 
wish to understand its character and the parameters of its operation. It is contended in this 
article that this is no longer satisfactory and further that in Bell’s proposed lex pacificatoria a 
potential basis for analysis and understanding of some the core questions relating to good 
offices’ unstructured nature maybe discussed.3 These questions include, among other queries, 
whether the move from state-based to institutional good offices has changed a fundamental 
quality of its operation, how the actors who carry out good offices obtain their legitimacy and 
whether these actors become part of the settlement itself or remain purely international 
interlopers and most significantly how to satisfactorily define good offices. 
One recent example of good offices’ evolution is the Elders. This innovation acts as an 
exemplifier of the fractured understanding of good offices. Established in 2007, the Elders 
are a collection of senior figures from world politics brought together to undertake good 
offices.
4
 A private initiative, it aims to bring together global figures of recognised integrity 
who can act independent of any governmental or other influences.
5
 They ‘offer their 
collective influence and experience to support peace building, help address major causes of 
human suffering and promote the shared interests of humanity.’6 Elders are to use their good 
offices to attempt to bring about the pacific settlement of some of the world’s longest running 
conflicts.
7
 Several elements are intriguing here. For instance, as the result of private activism 
and not born of the more traditional governmental route, it raises interesting questions 
regarding the role of civil society. The group seeks to go beyond policy creation, research or 
influence which, as an NGO, would be its more likely avenue of activism. Other issues 
include the alignment of potentially quite influential and powerful voices that, by and large, 
were once governmental figures and the place of civil society with international law. 
However, for the purposes of this piece it serves as an example of the splintered 
understanding of good offices. Another current example is the activities of Tony Blair in the 
Middle East. As the Special Envoy of the Quartet, the UN, the US, the EU and Russia, Blair 
represents, alongside the Elders, the new generation of non-state, non institutional, actors in 
the settlement of international conflict While the focus of this article is not on these Elders or 
Blair specifically, they do serve to underpin the questions that are raised regarding the 
parameters of good offices and its evolution over the past 100 years.  
Both the practice and doctrinal underpinnings of good offices need to be more clearly 
determined. The specific actions that practitioners of good offices may or may not take, if it is 
entirely an internal dispute are practitioners domestic actors or does their presence 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
International Law’ (Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), Ian Johnstone, ‘Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of 
Persuasion Based on Law’ (2003) Global Governance 441 
3
 Christine Bell, ‘On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria’ (OUP 2008) 
4
 See< www.theelders.org> accessed  23 May 2011 
5
The founders of the organisation were Richard Branson and Peter Gabriel together with other private 
individuals. This is a remarkable movement of civil society into a realm traditionally not accessed by non-
governmental organisations. Details available at <www.theelders.org/organisation/supporters> accessed 23 May 
2011 
6
 Persons eligible to be members, ‘should have earned international trust, demonstrated integrity and built a 
reputation for inclusive, progressive leadership’ The current Elders are Martti Ahtisaari, Kofi Annan, Ela Bhatt, 
Lakhdar Brahimi, Gro Brundtland, Fernando H Cardoso, Jimmy Carter, Graça Machel, Mary Robinson, 
Desmond Tutu, as well as two honorary Elders Nelson Mandela and Aung San Suu Kyi see 
<http://www.theelders.org/elders/> accessed  23 May 2011 
7
 The Elders are active in The Sudan, Burma, Zimbabwe, North Korea and Cyprus see 
<http://www.theelders.org> accessed 23 May 2011 
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internationalise a conflict, if those using their good offices become signatories or monitors of 
peace agreements do they take on a domestic constitutional role are questions which largely 
remain unanswered. A resolution of the meaning of good offices will not provide a solution 
to all of these questions but the placement of good offices within Bell’s lex pacificatoria 
framework may well assist in at least contextualising good offices within the broader arena of 
modern conflict resolution.  
Good offices are used widely outside the context of the settlement of violent conflicts and as 
such this piece will not be a discussion of the broader questions regarding its character.
8
 
However, in this discrete area, where lex pacificatoria has a discernable impact, it may serve 
as a source of analysis of the broad array of activities undertaken under the title of good 
offices.  
In her book, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex Pacificatoria Bell argues 
that lex pacificatoria, or the law of the peacemaker, is a superior method of categorising and 
analysing the law surrounding the resolution of conflicts. This lex is an alternative to 
grappling with the dichotomy that is created when international and domestic law compete 
for dominance. She proposes that lex pacificatoria has emerged to encompass the various 
forms of conflict as well as the methods utilised to bring conflict to an end. The proposed 
doctrine establishes the place of law is in the midst of these conflicts and how law is best 
understood as a tool of pacific settlement. Bell’s contention is that the hybrid nature of this 
lex, which encompasses both international and domestic law, creates this new categorisation 
of law. This new lex centres on the resolution of violent conflict, but is neither defined by 
temporality nor by the actors involved. It is this obscurity of character that Bell is seeking to 
understand with this lex. If lex pacificatoria is to succeed it must encompass the disparate 
elements of conflict settlement and provide a sound framework to succinctly analyse the 
actors and their legal progeny. It could establish a unified vision of the place of international, 
domestic and lex pacificatoria itself in the resolution of violent conflict.  
This article has two main motivations, firstly to consider good offices and secondly to 
examine whether Bell’s theory gives a basis for understanding good offices’ operation. The 
article first examines the historical development of good offices, it will look at the 
development of good offices in the last century and its contemporary utility in the resolution 
of violent conflicts in the 21
st
 Century and following this ask whether Bell’s lex exists and, if 
it does, where good offices would be situated in its structure. This examination centres on the 
activities of the UN Secretary General as this office, in many ways, exemplifies the questions 
raised by good offices. The role of the UN Secretary General also serves to narrate the move 
away from state-centred good offices, into an entirely unique role for the heads of 
international organisations which has rarely been successfully scrutinised.
9
 This article will 
examine the relationship between lex pacificatoria and good offices and ultimately seeks to 
answer the question of whether this new lex can finally lead to a coherent understanding of 
good offices. 
                                                          
8
 See for example its operation within the WTO, article 5 & 22 Understanding on the Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, Agreement Establishing the WTO (1994) 33 ILM 1125 and 
Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (adopted 22 March 1985) 1513 UNTS 293 , article 11 
9
 Recognising that it is often not the Secretary General, but a representative of the office who is often the actual 
UN official involved in good offices, this article will nonetheless focus on the actions taken by the Secretary 
General. See Simmonds, ‘Good Offices and the Secretary General’, Franck, ‘The Secretary General’s Role in 
Conflict Resolution’, Brehio, ‘Preventative Measures’ 
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II. GOOD OFFICES 
 
Boutros Ghali stated that good offices ‘is a very flexible term as it may mean very little or 
very much.’10 While this depiction may underpin good office’s mercurial nature it also 
emphasises the lack of clarity as to its content. Good offices can be depicted from two 
standpoints; as a secondary aspect of third-party settlement that is a catch all for various 
forms of peacemaking or alternatively as a distinctive method which unlike other kinds of 
dispute settlement is defined by the peacemaker and not the divergent structures it may take. 
While the latter is the more difficult perspective to prove it is perhaps the more accurate. Yet 
in the rather sparse analysis thus far undertaken in the literature, establishing this is not aided 
by either the development of treaty law or analysis of practice.
11
 As UN Secretary General De 
Cuéllar stated good offices is ‘quiet diplomacy’12 and whilst this has allowed good offices to 
become a vital aspect of the pacific settlement of disputes it has also made scrutiny difficult. 
Legal definitions of good offices are alternatively circular or vague and for the most part are a 
reflexive description of what the concept may potentially entail or on the other hand what it is 
not.  
Dixon argues that third-party settlement involves “conflict management agents” who come in 
the form of international organisations, nation states, coalitions of nation states, transnational 
or sub-national organisations, ad hoc commissions, individuals or any other actor of 
international standing.
13
 This is a broad state-based list which encapsulates the core issues 
encountered when attempting to establish a clear set of principles linked to a particular form 
of dispute settlement.
14
 Yet, omissions from the list include important non-statist actors such 
as civil society (in the form of the “Elders” discussed above) and transnational communities 
(which may include borderless religious organisations or diasporas), which are also involved 
in pacific settlement and should not therefore be presented as less significant agents. As 
Vicuna notes in modern dispute settlement ‘[t]he role of non State actors has challenged the 
traditional exclusivity of States.’15 While in this piece the good offices of heads of 
international organisations are the focus, this broader context is central to understanding 
conflict resolution as it presently stands.  
In particularly acrimonious disputes it may be harder to move factions to agree to a dispute 
settlement format which is not clearly delineated; in these incidences good offices may be 
configured to suit the needs of the actors involved. In other incidences it may be better to 
remain vague as to good offices’ content. There is also an element of ownership attached to 
                                                          
10
 Statement of the Secretary General, UN Doc. SG/SM/3525, as reported in The United Nations Handbook on 
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States, UN Doc. OLA/COD/2394, 35. 
11
 For a excellent overview of international dispute settlement see John G. Merrils, International Dispute 
Settlement (5th edn CUP 2011) particularly with regard to good offices, 222-225, some pieces which 
specifically discuss good offices include; Gordenker, Maintenance of Peace 144, Franck, The Secretary 
General’s Role in Conflict Resolution’ 360, Brehio, ‘Preventative Measures’, Ramcharan, ‘The Good Offices of 
the United Nations Secretary-General in the Field of Human Rights’, Simmonds, ‘Good Offices and the 
Secretary General’, Fischer, Switzerland’s Good Offices, In Larger Freedom, Dixon ‘Third-party Techniques’, 
Vicuna, ‘New Dispute Settlement Procedures’, Probst, “Good Offices”, Ramcharan, Humanitarian Good 
Offices, I. Johnston, ‘Role of the UN Secretary-General: The Power of Persuasion Based on Law’ (2003) 9 
Global Governance 441 
12
 Robert Adams & Benedict Kingsbury (eds) ‘United Nations, Divided World’ (2nd edn Revised Clarendon 
Press 1996) 133 
13
 Dixon, ‘Third-party Techniques’ 
14
 Dixon, ‘Third-party Techniques’ 653-654 
15
 Vicuna, ‘New Dispute Settlement Procedures’, 60  
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good offices. An individual uses “her” good offices, a subjectivity which is not as present in 
other forms of conflict resolution and in many ways is central to understanding the 
differences between it and these other types of conflict resolution.  
The following definition of good offices is a good example of the historical understanding of 
its operation: 
The involvement of one or more States, or an international organisation in a dispute 
between other States with the aim of settling it or contributing to its settlement. A 
further aim of such involvement is the solution of specific problems, which the States 
in question are unable or unwilling to solve themselves. Finally the intention may 
simply be to establish or ease relations between certain States
16
 
Whilst this is a somewhat vague and narrow definition which would probably not be put 
forward today it does illustrate that it is the process involved in good offices which is 
paramount and not its form. Arguably this process differentiates good offices from other 
forms of dispute settlement. The definition also manages to eschew the use of conciliation or 
mediation as definitional attributes of good offices, a common characteristic of good offices 
classifications which will be discussed in the next section. As Merrils points out, alongside 
other forms of dispute settlement, good offices ‘cannot always be sharply distinguished from 
each other in practice, it is perhaps more accurate to suggest that good offices may include 
other forms of settlement in practice.
17
  
The definition above also shies away from a description of the measures undertaken to 
promote pacific settlement through good offices. Those omitted measures arguably have 
developed into the most important facets of good offices. If good offices is understood as a 
multifaceted form of dispute settlement with numerous techniques for resolution that is 
capable of evolving alongside the dispute understanding it as simply inter-state action is 
inappropriate. This understanding of good offices incorporates the undulation of conflict as it 
transforms from one classification to another, for example, from an intra-state to an 
internationalised conflict. As Bell points out, the participants in dispute settlement have 
moved beyond the state, and so too have the methods used by the practitioners of good 
offices. Indeed, the Commonwealth Secretary General is only involved in intra-state disputes 
and therefore his good offices would fall well outside the traditional definition above.
18
  
The following section will discuss the legal definitions of good offices and the possible 
limited utility of these explanations in understanding modern conflict management. It will 
also show the evolution of good offices, from a narrow state-led international practice to a 
role which can be domestic, international or a hybrid activity which may follow the trajectory 
of a conflict and utilise a plethora of conflict management strategies well into any post-
conflict scenario. This section will then focus upon the centrality of individuals as the 
purveyors of good offices, particularly the role of the UN Secretary General. This will 
                                                          
16
 Bernhardt Encyclopaedia of Public International Law II (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law 
and International law, 1999) 601, Though as Probst has pointed out, you could separate good offices into two 
categories, as he describes it the strict legal one and the more generic one. This misses one vital element 
however, both kinds are involved in legal settlement, supervision or resolution and therefore classifying them as 
legal good offices and non legal good offices does not result in any true understanding of their nature, nor does 
it take non-state actors in dispute settlement into account. Probst, “Good Offices” 1-2 
17
 John G. Merrils, ‘International Dispute Settlement’ (4th edn CUP, 2005) 217 
18For details of the Commonwealth’s involvement in good offices see 
<http://www.thecommonwealth.org/subhomepage/190691/>accessed 12 October 2010  
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underpin the relevance of good offices to conflict resolution and why its neglect as a point of 
analysis could potentially be remedied by lex pacificatoria. 
III. The evolution of good offices 
 
The progress of good offices, particularly since the passage of the 1899 Convention for the 
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes has been rapid. The most significant changes 
have occurred since the end of World War II, where good offices has shifted in emphasis 
from the role of states such as Switzerland or Norway to the heads of international 
organisations. More specifically, the UN Secretary General and others such as the 
Commonwealth Secretary General
19
 have played a part in significantly changing the 
understanding their role as exponents of good offices.  
Over the past sixty years good offices has evolved quickly from a narrow state-led form of 
diplomacy to presently incorporating a wide spectrum of settlement activities. These activates 
encompass not only, at its narrowest interpretation facilitating talks or other more procedural 
obligations but also comprises active participation in negotiating, implementing and 
supervising both peace agreements and a broader array of complicated and substantive long-
running settlements that often involve questions of humanitarian and human rights law.
20
 
Temporally good offices is employed as conflicts escalate into violence, during the conflict 
and also as a tool of resolution which can come in the form of negotiating ceasefires or most 
significantly the substantive settlement itself and after the conflict has ended into monitoring 
peace. This has moved good offices well beyond some of the traditional and particularly the 
pre-First World War treaty definitions.  
No authoritative description of good offices has emerged to reflect this change and thus it is 
the early definitions, dating from the turn of the last century, which set out the treaty-based 
definitions of good offices.
21
 This lack of certainty in the law of peace can be, as Bell 
describes, an advantage.
22
 Indeed, the parameters of action are often delineated in the terms 
of agreement, be it treaty, declaration or otherwise. For example Higgins, writing about the 
UN Secretaries General good offices, argues that resolutions seeking her to act are always 
framed to ‘leave the maximum flexibility.’23 In examining the historical development of good 
offices the difficulties with classifying them either in the traditional state-centred 
                                                          
19
The Commonwealth has become increasingly active in good offices, The Millbrook Commonwealth Action 
Programme on the Harare Declaration, 1995, Issued by Heads of Government, New Zealand, 12
th
 November 
1995, The Harare Commonwealth Declaration, 1991, Issued by Heads of Government in Harare, Zimbabwe, 
both available from the Commonwealth website at www.thecommonwealth.org. The Director General of the 
WTO is also active in good offices, The good offices role is contained in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
under article 5; ‘Good offices, conciliation and mediation are procedures that are undertaken voluntarily if the 
parties to the dispute so agree’. article 5.6 sets out the particular role of the Director General, ‘The Director-
General may, acting in an ex officio capacity, offer good offices, conciliation or mediation with the view to 
assisting Members to settle a dispute.’ The Director General may also offer his Good Offices to Least 
Developed Countries under article 24.2 to prevent a dispute going before a Panel. These efforts largely occur 
before the actual proceedings of the dispute settlement procedure are underway. Under article 22.6 as the 
procedure which may include both a Panel and an Appeal Review, is underway the Director General can appoint 
an arbitrator if the parties to the dispute cannot agree on various deadlines. 
20
See for example the description in Ramcharan, Humanitarian Good Offices 35-51, Ramcharan, ‘The Good 
Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General in the Field of Human Rights’ 
21
 This is besides the activities, for example, of the WTO Director General 
22
 Bell, On the Law of Peace166 
23
 Roslyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (OUP 1994) 172 
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international or domestic constitutional law becomes evident. Nonetheless, state-based actors 
can no longer be asserted to be the centre of conflict resolution. In this section a very brief 
overview will be given of how good offices have emerged in the 21
st
 Century as a possible 
exemplar of Bell’s lex and more broadly the movement of international law away from 
Westphalian assumptions of state supremacy in conflict resolution. 
A. Treaty Based Good Offices 
 
Several treaties, both international and regional, include good offices as a form of conflict 
settlement. One of the earliest of these treaties is the 1899/1907 Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes.
24
 It classifies good offices as sitting alongside 
mediation. Under Article 2, ‘[i]n case of disagreement or dispute, before an appeal to arms, 
the Contracting Parties agree to have recourse as far as circumstances allow to the good 
offices or mediation of one or more friendly powers.’25 This appears to suggest that there is a 
clear division between good offices and mediation though not necessarily as mutually 
exclusive remedies. Good offices is often linked to both mediation and conciliation, even 
though arguably it encompasses both as well as other forms of dispute settlement and even 
beyond settlement into supervision during the period of post-conflict settlement. As such, 
mediation is distinct from good offices but good offices may include mediation.  
Article 3 of the 1899/1907 Convention also states that, even during hostilities, powers that are 
‘strangers to the dispute’26 should offer their good offices on their own initiative. This right of 
initiative has been a significant feature of good offices, particularly as multilateralism has 
evolved in the post Charter era. This right of initiative has been utilised mainly by the UN 
Secretary General, with both the Commonwealth Secretary General and the WTO Director 
General legally curtailed in the actions they may take. Article 6 the 1899/1907 Convention 
goes on to state that good offices have ‘exclusively the character of advice and never 
has…binding force.’27 This aspect of the Convention has lost much of its significance as 
good offices have expanded into the realm of negotiation and binding settlements.
28
 This 
almost courteous version of good offices limits it to a very narrow base which would have 
little or no impact beyond cajoling parties into perhaps exchanging notes.  
The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement 1948 sets good offices as distinct from 
mediation.
29
 It is interesting as a regional and complete system of dispute resolution. More 
particularly in the evolution of good offices the characterisation of the move away from state-
led good offices into the realm of eminent citizens, later echoed by the establishment of the 
Elders, is important. Article IX states that; 
                                                          
24
1899 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1907 Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes 
25
 article 2 is identical in both conventions. 
26
 article 3, 1907 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
27
 Ibid. article 6  
28
 An obvious recent example being the Annan Plan in Cyprus which in allowing the then UN Secretary General 
draft the ultimately unsuccessful peace agreement went far beyond what could be considered to be advice, 
though it did not have any binding force. The details of which can be seen at <www.unficyp.org> accessed 24 
March 2010. An example of binding good offices was the settlement in the Rainbow Warrior dispute where Du 
Cuéller at the request of France and New Zealand negotiated a binding settlement between the two States. 
Rainbow Warrior Dispute (1987) 26 ILM 1346 
29
The American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (adopted April 30th 1948) 30 UNTS 55, (Pact of Bagota, A-42) for 
a examination of the revision of the system see A H. Robertson, ‘Revision of the Charter of the Organisation of 
American States’ (1968) 17 ICLQ 346 
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the procedure of Good Offices, consists in an attempt by one or more American 
Governments, not party to the controversy, or by one or more eminent citizens or any 
American State, which is not a party to the controversy to bring the parties together, 
so as to make it possible for them to reach an adequate solution between themselves.
30
  
Though this dates from the post Charter-era is it still quite a limited reading of good offices. 
In stressing the disparity between it and mediation as opposed to adopting mediation into the 
definition it limits good offices to mere advice. This definition was also contemporaneous 
with the nascent efforts of the UN Secretary General and the rise of international 
organisations in good offices. The essential difficulty in these treaty-based definitions is that 
they do not recognise the development of good offices alongside the conflict. Mediation, 
conciliation, negotiation all may form part of good offices as the needs of the conflict dictate; 
this is what has come to be elemental in understanding good offices, not as a single form of 
settlement, but as a plethora of formats.
31
  
B. State-based Good Offices 
 
To understand the origin of good offices it is necessary to understand its state-based 
foundation. Located in the heart of Europe, Switzerland, as a historically permanently neutral 
country,
32
 is well placed to provide good offices to warring parties.
33
 It first undertook the 
role of “protecting power” during the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). Though this role 
falls under the purview of humanitarian law, the vital negotiations between warring parties 
for the exchange of prisoners or information involves delicate negotiation and ultimately can 
and has lead to the resolution of disputes. Under the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War Switzerland continued this protecting power role for most of 
the major powers of the time except the USSR.
34
 During World War II Switzerland was 
successful in negotiating better conditions for some prisoners of war though little other 
negotiation between the two sides took place, one exception was the Swiss negotiated 
separate surrender of German forces in Italy. This lack of negotiation was due mainly to the 
Allies agreeing to accept nothing less than complete surrender from the Axis forces.
35
 In this 
period, with 36 mandates, Switzerland’s position as a protecting power reached its peak. Post 
World War II it has continued in this capacity, for example during the Suez Crises in 1956 
and the Falklands War in 1982.
36
 The most successful recent example of the use of 
Switzerland’s good offices was the French-Algerian settlement of 1962 which was the ‘last 
                                                          
30
 Ibid. article IX 
31
 These early interventions by the UN Secretary General include: UNSC Res 2, The Iranian Question (30
th
 
January 1946) UNSC Res 31, The Indonesian Question (25
th
 August 1947). A more recent example, in the non-
conflict good offices is the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, it provides in its 
dispute settlement procedure negotiation as the primary form of settlement, this is followed by good offices or 
mediation by a third party. This has since been supplemented by subsequent Conventions. 
32
 Swiss neutrality was recognised after the Thirty Years War in the Treaty of Westphalia 1648  
33
 As a more recent example in Europe Ireland has recently opened a good offices centre in its Department of 
Foreign Affairs, though neutral only on a policy basis See Aoife O’Donoghue ‘Neutrality and Multilateralism 
after the First World War’ (2010) 15 JCSL 202, it is an indicator that state based good offices is still alive and 
well. See <http://foreignaffairs.gov.ie/home/index.aspx?id=82471> accessed 23 May 2011 
34
1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (This has subsequently been replaced 
by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War) 
35
 F. Vagts Detlev, ‘Switzerland, International Law and World War II’, (1997) 91 AJIL, 466, 470 
36
 For a full account of Switzerland Protecting Power mandates see Fischer, Switzerland’s Good Offices 
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occasion during the Cold War where Switzerland successfully mediated on its own in an 
international conflict.’37 
Prior to World War I one of the most important examples and successes of state-guided good 
offices was the resolution, by the United States, of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). The 
negotiations, which were led by President Theodore Roosevelt and resulted in the Treaty of 
Portsmouth, formed the basis of Russian and Japanese relations until the outbreak of World 
War I.
38
 The United States was not conventionally one of the main exercisers of good 
offices,
39
 however this instance was effectively the last farewell of grandiose state-based 
great power diplomacy. While this is not an attempt to give a full overview of state-led good 
offices it nonetheless illustrates its decline as an alternative to subjective trust in the holders 
of international offices.  
C. Post Charter Good Offices 
 
Article 2(4) as well as Chapters VI and VII of the Charter require methods of pacific 
settlement to be more expansive than had previously been asserted under international law. 
Though Chapter VI of the Charter does not mention good offices in subsequent resolutions of 
the General Assembly and Security Council note is taken of the Secretary General’s good 
offices as a core method of dispute settlement and it is in this circumstance that good offices 
has developed its current incarnation.
40
 What is apparent under the Charter, as well as in the 
use of the Secretary General’s good offices, is that the character of any particular dispute will 
establish whether any binding measures can be forthcoming from good offices. The earlier 
Conventions, in omitting any binding quality, are now out of step with the practice discussed 
next. Specifically, good offices has developed most emphatically under the remit of Articles 
99 and 98 of the Charter. While the language of Article 99 is open to interpretation, it 
arguably infers that threats to international peace and security are of interest to everyone.
41
 
As such, it contrasts with the American Treaty where no strangers to a dispute may become 
involved in a dispute.
42
 
The UN Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes contains one of the most 
expansive official, though clearly non-legal, definitions. ‘When States party to a dispute are 
unable to settle it directly, a third party, may offer his [or her] good offices as a means of 
                                                          
37
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38
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preventing further deterioration of the dispute and as a method of facilitating efforts towards 
a peaceful settlement of the dispute.’43 It goes on to state that ‘[t]he third party exercising 
good offices normally seeks to encourage the parties to the dispute to resume negotiations, 
thus providing them with a channel of communication.’44 This more accurately reflects what 
good offices have, in practice, become. While other areas such as mediation and adjudication 
have become increasingly significant in international dispute settlement, in situations of 
violent conflict, good offices fulfil the central role of providing a forum and enabling a 
flexible framework to become preeminent.  
Thus there is no satisfactory legal definition of what good offices entails. The next section 
will specifically deal with the good offices of the heads of international organisations with an 
emphasis on the UN Secretary General and attempts to delineate how practice has established 
what good offices entails in the 21st Century.  
IV. GOOD OFFICES AND THE HEADS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
This section aims to discuss the evolution of good offices through the prism of the heads of 
international organisations. The Commonwealth Secretary General will be first briefly 
discussed, followed by a more in depth discussion of the UN Secretary General. The UN 
Secretary General has been at the forefront of the development of good offices over the past 
60 years. In developing this role the Secretary General has had to navigate the restraints of 
both the UN structure itself as well as the complicated issues which have built up around 
conflict resolution. The section discusses how the UN Secretary General, as the driver behind 
good offices’ development in the post-Charter era, has changed the understanding of its 
operation.
45
 
The good offices of the Commonwealth Secretary General are a distinct form of conflict 
management which is entirely circled by the membership of the Commonwealth.
46
 In Fiji, 
Cameroon, Bangladesh, Guyana, Swaziland, Kenya, the Maldives and Tonga, among others, 
the Secretary General of the Commonwealth has successfully utilised good offices to bring 
about a pacific settlement.
47
 Within the Commonwealth good offices are limited to its 
membership and to the upkeep of a certain standard of democracy that the organisation 
aspires to represent.
48
 In contrast to the UN which regarded intra-state conflicts as outside its 
remit unless they posed a threat to international peace and security or there was a request 
from a government to intervene, the Commonwealth is, thus far, limited to these conflicts.
49
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Therefore, it ‘has not become involved in any conflict resolution between member states 
though it remains ready and willing to do so if asked by governments concerned.’50  
The Commonwealth may act in concert with other organisations, be they regional, global, or 
with civil society. These good offices are never self-initiated, always arising out of the 
invitation of governments. The limitation to intra-state conflicts and the lack of self initiation 
together curtail the form which Commonwealth good offices takes, though this does not mean 
that it cannot positively contribute to pacific settlement. It is an example of how a very 
particular organisation can use its good offices to ease tensions in a discreet manner but also 
how international organisations can take the lead in conflict resolution.
51
 
The Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations stated that the Charter 
granted to the Secretary General a broad role in dispute settlement, ‘The secretary general 
may have an important role to play as a mediator and as an informal advisor of many 
governments…to take decisions which may be justly called political.’52 The establishment of 
dual roles in the office, both bureaucratic and political, is important. This duality is mirrored 
in the involvement of Secretaries General in good offices, both as political office holders and 
as bureaucratic or legal enforcers of peace agreements. The rather limited role of the first 
Secretary General Lie should be starkly contrasted to that which is now available to Ban Ki-
moon. In many ways the evolution mirrors the progression of good offices from a very 
narrow doctrine to one central to conflict resolution. While the UN Charter is the legal basis 
on which the Secretaries General have based their activities it has been the active engagement 
in the process of conflict resolution which has led to much of the expansion over the past 60 
years.  
Under Article 99 of the Charter,
53
 ‘the Secretary General may bring to the attention of the 
Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of 
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international peace and security’ though as Kofi Annan has pointed out, ‘successive Secretary 
Generals …have invoked this article very sparingly.’54 Hammarskjöld argued that Article 99 
enables the Secretary General to undertake informal diplomatic activity with regard to 
international peace and security, which Johnstone asserts is the basis for good offices that 
arguably good offices has evolved from a much broader basis.
55
 Article 98 grants to the 
Secretary General the capacity to, ‘perform such other functions as are entrusted to him’ by 
the Security Council, the General Assembly among others. These articles are the springboard 
from which the Secretary General’s good offices role has emerged.  
The Report on UN reform, In Larger Freedom, argues that to ensure the ongoing success of 
good offices continues additional resources for the further expansion of the role are required. 
‘[U]sing the Secretary General’s Good Offices to help resolve conflicts…but we could 
undoubtedly save many more live…I urge Member States to allocate additional resources to 
the Secretary General for his good offices function.’56 While this has not been followed by a 
formalisation of the role but it does indicate its prominence.  
The initial steps into good offices by the UN Secretary General set the tone for what would 
follow. Crises in Iran, North Korea, Suez and Congo enabled the Secretary General to 
position the office at the centre of conflict management. The first time the Security Council 
made use of the Secretary General’s good offices was in 1946 during the Soviet occupation 
of the Northern Azeri region of Iran, though the Secretary General had also been engaged 
here on his own initiative.
57
 In the absence of the USSR, a resolution was past which asked 
all parties to the dispute to report to the Secretary General on troop withdrawal, a Secretary 
General practice of post conflict monitoring which has since become a significant element of 
good offices.
58
  
In 1950, Lie was invited by the Security Council to report on the circumstances subsequent to 
the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Lie, setting the tone for future reports, made his 
report in what has been described as a partisan, not purely “fact-finding” manner.59 Franck 
points out that the making of reports on Security Council mandates to settle disputes allows 
the Secretary General to apportion blame and maintain a separate opinion to the disputants 
and indeed the Security Council itself.
60
 Such requests for reports, which could be 
characterised as a form of inquiry, have become very common, with as many as 80 reports in 
2010 alone.
61
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In March 1956, under instructions from the Security Council, Dag Hammarskjöld became 
embroiled in the Suez Crisis.
62
 He reported on the level of compliance with the armistice 
agreement and made attempts to restore its effectiveness. He played a crucial role in bringing 
a relaxation in tensions and it has been reported that the parties involved in the armistice 
spoke of confidence in him.
63
 The nature of this proactive engagement as a guarantor in the 
post conflict environment is an early indicator of what good offices was moving towards. The 
range of activities involved in this instance is also significant, even the short description here 
indicates a much broader role than that outlined in the treaty definitions already discussed. 
It was in the Congo that Hammarskjöld really pushed the boundaries of the good offices role. 
As Gordenker points out, ‘[n]othing had more novelty than the role of the Secretary General 
in organising and directing the deployment of armed battalions.’64 Prior to his Security 
Council mandate in the Congo, Hammerskjöld had already used his Article 99 powers to 
recommend the dispatch of peacekeepers to the region.
65
 The autonomy Hammarskjöld had 
under the Security Council mandate was unprecedented.
66
 This free-reign meant that he could 
respond to the pace of change on the ground. For the first time, the Secretary General was 
able to make decisions whose solutions were not already fixed by the Security Council. To 
illustrate just how the decisions were made in the Congo Hammerskjöld gave a line of 
authority to which a Secretary General should adhere when making determinations of what 
actions to follow. He argued she should first follow, ‘the principles and purposes of the 
Charter which are fundamental law and accepted by and binding on all States.’67 Secondly 
these were complemented with ‘the body of legal doctrine and precepts that have been 
accepted by States generally and particularly as manifested in the resolutions of UN 
organs.’68  
This explanation does not however present any possibility of good offices working within or 
being the realms of international law and thus weakens the potential for understanding its 
function more fully, particularly when the Secretary General becomes embroiled in 
constitutional transitional arrangements.
69
 Yet, Hammarskjöld appears to be implying that it 
is only after guaranteeing compliance with the Charter, that the Security Council resolution 
becomes the guide to a Secretary General’s actions. Kofi Annan also argued that, ‘[a] 
Secretary General must be judged by his fidelity to the principles of the Charter.’70 This 
emphasises the office of Secretary General as an entirely independent actor not reliant upon 
the Security Council in conflict management.  
Thant was the first Secretary General to become embroiled in the Cypriot conflict. Although 
the conflict began in the mid-fifties it was not until 1964, at the behest of the Security 
Council,
71
 that Thant became involved.
72
 It has since provided a common thread in which all 
                                                          
62
 UNSC Res 118 Complaint by France and the United Kingdom against Egypt (13
th
 October 1956), UNSC Res 
119 Complaint by Egypt against France and the United Kingdom (31
st
 October 1956) 
63
Gordenker, Maintenance of Peace 157 
64
 Ibid. 
65
Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations, Volume 2, The Age of Decolonisation 1955-1965 (Macmillan 
Press Ltd 1989) 220 
66
 UNSC Res. 143, The Congo Question (17
th
 July 1960) 
67
Harold K Jacobson, Networks of Independence: International Organisations and the Global Political System 
(Alfred A. Knopf Publishing), 137 
68
 Ibid. 137 
69
 See for example the Annan Plan 
70
 Podium: ‘Impartiality does not mean Neutrality. From a speech by the Secretary General of the United 
Nations to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York’ The Independent (London January 22nd 1999) 
71
 UNSC Res. 186, The Cyprus Question (4
th
 March 1964)  
 
 
15 
 
of Thant’s successors have been occupied.73 As the conflict itself progresses the methods 
utilised by the Secretary General also evolves. From the limited techniques employed by 
Thant to Annan’s composition of an unsuccessful settlement, Cyprus is a good example of 
the particular role good offices plays. In March of 1966 the first of many unsuccessful efforts 
to find a solution was made. In 1974, after the Turkish invasion, Waldheim aided in the 
development of a framework for negotiation, nonetheless, he stated ‘[o]n leaving Nicosia in 
February 1977, I felt as if the UN had accomplished a great deal; all the same I realised that it 
would be some time before a settlement could be reached.
 74
 That became even clearer during 
the 6
th
 round of talks that April in Vienna, which brought no progress.’75 Boutros Ghali began 
intensive negotiations to resolve the dispute in 1993 maintaining that the, ‘continuation of the 
status quo was not a viable option.’76 This was welcomed by the Security Council though 
again it did not result in a resolution.
77
  
Annan, while once again not succeeding in settling the conflict, utilised good offices in an 
expansive manner. His attempts to resolve the conflict moved far beyond the traditional role 
of facilitator to becoming an arbitrator and ultimately composer of a proposed final 
settlement. Under the Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Plan, if the parties failed to 
negotiate a solution they agreed to put to their people an agreement devised by the Secretary 
General.
78
 This vote occurred on the 24
th
 April 2004, the Turkish Cypriots accepted it by a 
margin of two to one; however the Greek Cypriots refused to accede by a margin of three to 
one.
79
 Afterward, echoing Boutros Ghali, Annan stated that, ‘there is no apparent basis for 
resuming the Good Offices effort while the current stalemate continues’.80  
What is intriguing about this round of negotiations is the authority Annan had to circumvent 
the parties and address the populations directly. While in the Congo, despite Hammarskjöld’s 
power to conduct battles on the ground, he did not have the authority to bypass the political 
representatives and go directly to the people with a resolution.
81
. Even by the broadest of 
definitions, this power goes far beyond what would traditionally be regarded as good offices. 
It does exemplify just how much the role has grown and the trust parties and the Security 
Council now have in good offices, subsequent acrimonious comments aside.
82
 The current 
Secretary General is once again attempting to apply his good offices as ongoing negotiations 
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between the sides continue, with talks having resumed in May, 2010.
83
 Yet, this is one 
example where the lack of clear guidance or insight into the remit of good offices has made 
the Secretary General an all too easy target for criticism and claims that he has gone beyond 
his remit. In the aftermath of the Annan Plan it was arguably easier for the participants to 
make claims that Annan had overstepped the mark both as Secretary General and in his use of 
good offices as the legal parameters in which modern good offices operates is nebulous at 
best. 
The General Assembly has not been as prolific as the Security Council in asking the 
Secretary General to use his good offices. Nevertheless it has been the General Assembly 
which has confirmed the importance of the Secretary General in dispute settlement.
84
 An 
early example of the General Assembly’s commitment was the establishment in 1950 of a 
Permanent Commission for Good Offices.
85
  
One of the most significant features of General Assembly activates has been Secretary 
General’s occasional adjustment of his mandate under what is known as the “Peking 
Formula.” If, after having received instruction from the General Assembly, a Secretary 
General finds that the mandate either restricts negotiations or alternatively criticises one or 
more of the parties to a degree that it hinders negotiations he will distance the good offices 
from the resolution. This first occurred in 1954 when Hammarskjöld was asked by the 
General Assembly to negotiate the release of US aircrew hostages that having crashed in 
Chinese territory and were being held. The resolution heavily condemned the Chinese action 
in detaining the aircrew.
86
 In order to reach a deal, Hammarskjöld disengaged himself from 
the very resolution that gave him his mandate. He assured the Chinese Government that their 
acceptance of him as the negotiator did not imply acceptance of the condemnation. The 
General Assembly use of good offices while contemporaneously accepting impartial political 
and diplomatic activity on the part of the Secretary General was nascent in developing the 
autonomy of the role. Hammarskjöld considered these developments to ‘led to the acceptance 
of an independent political and diplomatic activity on the part of the Secretary General as the 
neutral representative of the Organisation’.87  
Du Cuéllar’s employment of the Peking Formula during the Afghan conflict is one of the 
more striking examples of its use. The USSR’s veto in the Security Council meant that the 
General Assembly played a prominent role in granting a mandate to begin negotiations.
88
 The 
General Assembly resolution called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops; this was 
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entirely unacceptable to the USSR and the Afghan Government it was supporting.
89
 In order 
to conduct negotiations without the resolution stymieing dialogue the Secretary General 
distanced himself from it with successful results.
90
 Urquhart described the Secretary 
General’s involvement as ‘offer [ing] a compelling example of an exceedingly difficult and 
long step by step process of UN conflict resolution in a situation in which others could not or 
did not wish to act.’91 Further efforts were undertaken to resolve the domestic upheaval in 
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal; however the collapse of the Najibullah regime in 
1992 and the rise of the Taliban left little room for negotiation.
92
  
Outside of the Security Council and General Assembly mandates, the Secretary General has 
employed good offices in a number of other occasions. In 1983 De Cuéllar together with the 
Secretary General of the OAS and the Contadora Group worked together to finalise a 
settlement of the many disputes that were entrenched in Central and South America.
93
 As 
each dispute possessed its own particular characteristics a number of different conflict 
management methods were employed. Their efforts resulted in the Arias plan, the Esquipalas 
Accords I and II and the Declaration of Costa del Sol (these agreements included El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica).
94
 De Cuéllar’s involvement in Central 
America continued it was reported that on his last day in office, ‘he refused to leave until the 
last intractable differences were settled, continuing his mediation 6 hours past the time he 
was due to depart.’95 His personal involvement in settling the conflicts in Central America 
was decisive and without his intense motivation, it is doubtful that it would have been such a 
successful outcome. The fact that the majority of the activities undertaken were outside a 
Security Council or General Assembly mandate, helped to cement the independent good 
offices role. 
The ability of the Secretary General to use Article 99, though it has been sparingly applied, in 
circumstances where he felt there was a threat to international peace and security, aided in the 
development of autonomous initiatives. In 1972 Waldheim used Article 99 to highlight the 
problem of international terrorism. This was an interesting departure in that it was not a 
specific incident, but a global problem, which was largely not state-specific, impacting upon 
international peace and security. In 1978 Waldheim again invoked Article 99 regarding the 
deteriorating situation in Lebanon. The Security Council, following his report, adopted a 
resolution giving Waldheim responsibility for the setting up peacekeeping force for 
Lebanon.
96
  
A more recent development has been the use of good offices entirely outside the realm of the 
UN. This occurs where a request is made by parties to a dispute to the Secretary General to 
use his good offices. Probably the most famous incident of this type was the Rainbow 
Warrior Dispute.
97
 An important aspect of this new departure is the amount of confidence 
now placed in the office of Secretary General and the authority that has been assigned to her. 
This confidence is quite distinct to that which comes through the Charter and is used by the 
Security Council or the General Assembly. How much this new authority depends on the 
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individual personality of the incumbent or the political climate at the time is unclear. Some 
observers have argued that when De Cuéllar took over as Secretary General in 1982 that his 
predecessors had created a, ‘dispute settlement role’ that could be in opposition to the 
position taken by most of the members of the UN.
98
 Yet, not agreeing with an opinion or the 
general mood of the membership and being in conflict to a resolution are not equivalent; 
especially should the resolution be adopted under Chapter VII by the Council.
99
 The 
Secretary General must therefore tread carefully when choosing which conflicts in which to 
become embroiled on the invitation of the disputants or under her own accord. While there is 
little or no possibility of review of the internal workings of the UN, Secretaries General have 
previously found there positions untenable due to opposition from member states, though this 
question relates more to the office of Secretary General than specifically to good offices.  
Inevitably there have been times when the Secretary General’s good offices have been futile 
or efforts to resolve a conflict elusive. This is probably best exemplified by the continuing 
attempts to reach a settlement in Cyprus. Though the bloodshed ended quite some time ago 
the intransigence of both sides has left successive Secretaries General in the unenviable 
position of attempting to find an accommodation that for some forty years has been 
unattainable.  
The Security Council and the General Assembly have continued to make use of the now 
varied good offices role. Their assignment of such important missions, the independence that 
they have afforded to the Secretary General’s office and their support of the initiatives of the 
Secretaries General have proven the depth of confidence now given to the good offices role. 
The legal basis of the Secretary General’s good offices is not clearly demarcated. De Cuéllar 
stated that the Secretary General ‘is a world citizen because all the world problems are his 
problems; the Charter is his home and his ideology and its principles are his moral code’.100 
This is nowhere clearer than in good offices.  
Dixon noted in 1996 that the end of the Cold War was ‘a crucial turning point in the 
management of international conflict’ as pacific settlement of disputes emerged from the 
quagmire it had become immersed in.
101
 Franck predicted that good offices would stagnate.
102
 
Good offices did perhaps look as if it would reduce in importance. This is most visibly seen 
in the limited role Du Cuéllar had after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, with his mandate limited 
to meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.
103
 This circumscribed role left no 
room for negotiation other than merely requesting that the Iraqis leave Kuwait immediately. 
Yet Annan would later play a significant role during the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 which suggests that good offices have continued to play a prominent role in the work of 
the Secretary General.
104
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A. Good offices today 
 
Thus there is no satisfactory legal definition of what good offices entails. The form which is 
it takes largely depends on the circumstances in which it is requested or the mandate given to 
heads of international organisations by the institutions themselves. As a broad concept it is 
rarely abhorrent to disputants; it can conform and therefore adapt and evolve as negotiations 
advance. There is no catalogue of its exact content; rather it is intended to settle the conflict 
in the manner most suited to the situation. This can also be problematic, especially when the 
chief officer of an organisation has a panoply of other responsibilities and duties that 
potentially clash with a good offices’ role. Where the delineations are unclear, vigilance is 
required to ensure that it always remains within the scope of what the particular institutions 
want their heads of organisation to become involved in and what is legitimate within the 
constitutional settlements of a state or states. This is where lex pacificatoria may be useful in 
establishing a parameter within which the process operates which is not dependent upon the 
bounds of traditional treaty law both between states and international organisations. 
This section is not intended as an exhaustive analysis of the good offices of heads of 
international institutions. Rather it is an attempt to present the unstructured nature of the 
forms and processes associated with the practice of good offices in modern conflict 
resolution. What is clear from this synopsis is that contrary to the legal definitions presented 
by the various treaties discussed earlier good offices is a much more intricate form of conflict 
resolution than merely acting as a go-between. There are five basic arguments that set out the 
unique nature of good offices and why a re-conceptualisation of its legal basis is required to 
full encapsulate its present operation. 
Firstly, a good offices practice has emerged, particularly in the Charter era that downgrades 
the importance of early treaty definitions. Secondly, good offices can follow the temporal and 
participant shifts in a particular conflict and is able to adapt to such changes. The most 
obvious example of this has been in Cyprus, where the evolution of the Secretary General’s 
role has been an exemplar of how good offices can adapt to changing circumstances. Thirdly, 
good offices can be purely inter-state and thus international, entirely domestic or a mix of 
both, thus requiring a hybrid international/domestic legal understanding of good offices itself 
and the resultant peace settlement. The contrast in activities between the UN and 
Commonwealth Secretaries General is prime examples of the contrasting roles which good 
offices may fulfil that do not neatly come within the traditional international/domestic law 
dichotomy and the roles of international actors themselves as conflict management agents. 
Fourthly, good offices can continue in the post conflict scenario in the form of guarantor of 
enforcement and compliance.
105
 This is clear in the Secretary General’s involvement in Suez 
and Cyprus, where monitoring of conflicts and the reports produced by the office of Secretary 
General played an important role in the post conflict scenario. Finally, good offices are 
subjective in that it is confidence in both the individual and the office which is paramount. 
Thus the evolution of both the office of UN and Commonwealth Secretary General, both in 
the good offices role and besides, have been significant in understanding why such trust is 
placed in the offices and the individual’s abilities to bring about an end to conflict.  
This combination of factors makes the characterisation of good offices within the 
international/domestic law divide complicated. While it may be possible to discuss the UN 
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Secretary General’s good offices within the confines of the institution itself, understanding 
good offices as a more extensive form of conflict resolution presents obstacles. The most 
significant of which is while mediation, conciliation and other forms of conflict resolution are 
largely defined by the actual practice involved, good offices is centred around the actor who 
is undertaking the role. As such good offices can encompass any number of forms of conflict 
resolution, it may be entirely international or domestic or combination of both, good offices is 
defined by the actor undertaking the role, not by the form of conflict resolution that is 
undertaken. As there is currently little guidance other than what has been built through 
practice this leaves a gap in the analysis and the law. The next section will question whether 
Bell’s lex presents a suitable resolution to this fissure. 
V. LEX PACIFICATORIA 
 
Bell proposes lex pacificatoria as ‘a new law of the peacemakers’106 distinguishable from 
both international and domestic law.
107
 This necessitates an analysis of law in peacemaking 
which is different to the traditional delineations that have in the past sustained legal analysis 
in conflict resolution. Good offices would inevitably come within this new conception of law 
as it is often the main or part of an array of processes employed to establish permanent peace. 
Yet before examining good offices within lex pacificatoria it will be necessary to discuss 
Bell’s theory in more detail.  
In 2006 Bell pointed to recent common trends that she argues gave rise to this new area of 
law.
108
 Firstly, the end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the volume of violent conflicts 
that are entirely intra-state, secondly a new form of negotiation has evolved which focuses on 
direct talks between governments and armed groups, thirdly this resulted in patterns of 
resolution methods being established which drew a path between ceasefires and subsequent 
agreements resulting in new power distributions.
109
 Bell later expanded this framework to 
include peacemaking in a much broader historical context. While many of the features 
described by Bell have come to prominence in the post Cold War, the elements just identified 
could certainly also be recognised in the evolution of good offices just discussed.
110
 This is 
probably most evident in the changes in resolution methods brought about in the practice of 
good offices.  
Sovereignty's place as the dominant feature of a traditional international law is at the core of 
Bell’s argument for a realignment of the law.111 Affirming the importance of human rights, 
self-determination and peacekeeping in the development of this lex, Bell contends that the 
traditional accounts do not accurately represent the impact that peace agreements have had 
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upon sovereignty and law.
112
 She concludes that the, ‘twentieth century consolidation of 
treaty-making practice as a practice between states can be viewed as an aberration from what 
went before.’113 This is exemplified by the role of the Elders,’ Tony Blair and most 
importantly the heads of international organisations now play in good offices.
114
  
Peace agreements are essential in this lex’s composition; their formation, trajectories, 
classification and most importantly their hybrid nature illustrate why lex pacificatoria ought 
to be considered as separate both in practice and in analysis from traditional approaches to 
law. Bell defines peace agreements as, ‘documents produced after discussion with some or all 
of the conflict’s protagonists that address militarily violent conflicts with a view to ending 
it.’115 Neither low level civil disturbances nor border incidences fall within this classification. 
The rise of peace agreements, the patterns into which they fit and their historical development 
set the confines of the lex perhaps better than the definition of peace agreements. Bell sets out 
three tenants of peace agreements, firstly they are both local and global, secondly they are 
hybrid international and domestic documents and thirdly they are simultaneously both 
process and substance.
116
 Bell’s assertion that peace agreements are both global and local 
alludes to their local particularities but that they are also globalised in their incorporation of 
shared understandings of law. This in itself could lead to a disparate and anarchic array of 
examples, however if it is to be understood that Bell is implying that it is the identification of 
these two within peace agreements and not substantive examples, then it is a more sustainable 
argument.  
The move towards local ownership of peace agreements shifts the emphasis from the state 
and to international law at a range of governance levels.
117
 This necessitates an understanding 
of constitutionalism as core to the character of peace agreements. Bell’s examination of 
hybridity attempts to reconcile peace agreements as treaties and Westphalian international 
law. Bringing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
118
 the Geneva Conventions,
119
 
as well as customary international law together, 
120
 generates an understanding of the law that 
is not restricted to the state and persuasively makes an argument for a re-assertion of a 
broader understanding of treaties.  
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In one of the few pieces to tackle Bell’s lex, Lang argues that a core problem with her theory 
is that in not establishing peace agreements as treaties their value as enforceable law is 
undermined and what results is soft law.
121
 Lang points to the ICJ’s decision in the Armed 
Activities case as an example of the detrimental impact of downgrading peace agreements 
upon their actual enforcement.
122
 He argues that the proposed lex operates as a form of soft 
law which will not have the requisite muscle to keep participants to their promises, surely a 
central premise of peacemaking. As such it will also undermine the long development of 
international law as binding. If correct this would be a persuasive argument against this lex 
but his analysis is based upon a misinterpretation of Bell’s theory.  
The form of hybridisation that Bell suggests does not necessarily result in the creation of soft 
law, nor does it demote any agreement or seek to change how these agreements are enforced. 
Instead, what Bell potentially establishes is a succinct understanding of these agreements as 
hybrid documents and not simply fitting them to categories, either international or domestic, 
as is convenient for enforcement. The composition of the Annan Plan in Cyprus could be an 
example of this hybridity. Bell in looking to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and customary international law indirectly addresses some of the concerns associated with 
defining all peace agreements as treaties.
123 
What Lang may be missing in his analysis is that 
if international legal personality is adhered to without reference to the equally important idea 
of subjectivity, and Westphalian methods of categorisation of law are clung to in all cases 
what will result is misapplication of the law.  
Hybrid self-determination in Bell’s lex means state redefinition, disaggregation and 
dislocation of power. State redefinition results from peace agreements fundamentally 
changing a state’s character. While this initially may be symbolic it results in change at a 
constitutional level that eventually leads to renewed legitimacy for that state.
124
 Arguably, 
legitimacy cannot be entirely based upon this assumption of change; this would require both 
the substance of the peace agreement and the process by which it is achieved, to find their 
legitimacy in the constitutionalised nature of the agreement. This would require too many 
assumptions regarding the nature of all peace agreements. State-redefinition arguably does 
occur, but its role as a legitimising factor as described by Bell is less convincing. The 
disaggregation of power re-conceptualises state power and sees it as addressing a state’s 
internal sovereignty. It encapsulates sub-division of power, incorporation of a human rights 
regimes and changes in governance.
125
 Dislocation of power is a more detailed concept, it 
moves power away from the territorially defined state and introduces one or both of two 
devices; that of bi or multi nationalism and international supervision, as is exemplified by the 
Secretary General in Suez. Thus traditional sovereignty is replaced in the law of peace by a 
more fluid understanding of its construction. International supervision generally requires a 
state to incorporate changes to ensure accommodation and inclusion of various groups, which 
can include good offices.
126
 This is closely linked to disaggregation of power and introduces 
another element into the process of governance.  
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Though the characterisations are not always as straightforward as just described, when these 
three elements are taken together hybrid self-determination emerges. However these three do 
bring together Bell’s idea of an international transitional constitution as potentially a more 
relevant description of what peace agreements entail and may indirectly answer some of 
Lang’s concerns.127  
Bell describes these categories as flexible and dynamic and argues that they reinforce the 
importance of law in understanding peace agreements but also the need to move beyond 
positivist definitions.
128
 Peace agreements should establish a set of obligations that will best 
lock state, non-state, international and domestic actors into relationships capable of 
implementing the peace agreement, as was done in the proposed Annan Plan.
129
 The content 
of these agreements veer between ambiguity, when it is necessary to get agreement where 
there is none, and precision, when transitional arrangements will only operate with clear 
deadlines.
130
 According to Bell this does not, as Lang assumes, mean that these lack form as 
legal documents, but simply illustrates law’s varying place in the transition from conflict to 
peace. However, if law varies to the degree suggested by Bell, does it play a largely 
secondary role in peace-building exercises. This is not to agree with Lang, but rather to 
acknowledge the complex contextual parameters of negotiation that emerge in these 
situations.  
Bell does not suggest that this is an entirely new body of law. Rather it is its hybrid character 
which highlights the traditional forms of categorisation as insufficient to fully understand the 
law that requires this lex, if it is to achieve its aims, to coherently situate law in peacemaking; 
otherwise it is merely being an exercise in rebranding. Much as the traditional treaty based 
definitions of good offices do not reflect its attachment to who is carrying out the role rather 
than a particular form of conflict resolution. This emergent field may also be symptomatic of 
the changes that have been perceived in the place of the state within international and 
transnational law.
131
 It is also indicative of the move away from state-led good offices. While 
the debate on the place of the state is far from settled it has created room for analysis such as 
Bell’s.  
Bell suggests that a common body of law has emerged that creates a constitutional order 
which is symptomatic of a new law. ‘Over the last fifteen years, an expertise has built up 
within international organisations, in particular the United Nations, and in the foreign offices 
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of many Western states that can be argued to have generated its own momentum...’.132 If this 
is indeed the case then good offices should fit well into Bell’s theory.  
A. Third Parties 
 
Third party participation in conflict resolution, including contributions that may or not be 
legal, questions of regulation and the ‘grey zones of accountability,’ have, as is evident in the 
earlier discussions on good offices, traditionally been difficult to analyse. In peacemaking, 
third parties can act as both external and self guarantors. As norm promoters they are placed 
at the core of peace agreements. Beyond the more traditional definitions of good offices, roles 
in interpretation and enforcement place third parties and thus good offices at the centre of this 
lex. Bell puts forth the contention that the more third parties are decision makers or enforcers 
the more legalised the process itself becomes.
133
 Thus international third parties become part 
of the domestic constitutional order, as arguably Annan did in Cyprus, and therefore the 
peace agreement is as domestic as it is international. The resultant law is thus entirely hybrid 
in nature and invokes a non-Westphalian account of both international and domestic law. The 
hybrid nature of the lex and the impact of hybrid self-determination are significant linked by 
Bell to the idea of the post-sovereign state.
134
  
In describing the difficulties involved in international transitional constitutional arrangements 
Bell incorporates the concept of constitutionalisation to conclude that it is necessary in 
further understanding the nature of peace documents.
135
 This is linked to issues of legitimacy 
which third parties may face as interlocutors or constitutional actors. Questions of ownership 
can be difficult. Authority for third party involvement may fluctuate due to changes in 
parties, the state and other aspects and this should not be underestimated as a factor for 
peace-makers.
136
 Certainly this has arisen for instance, with regard to the Secretary General 
and Cyprus, where the authorisation has come from the Secretary General, the parties 
themselves and self-initiation. The form of involvement has also evolved as the conflict has 
progressed. As Bell acknowledges third party involvement may result in both notions of 
positive social change and also imperialist or neo-colonial interpretations which as identified 
in the sub-altern movement can ultimately be destructive.
137
 The necessity of developing the 
Peking Formula underpins this argument. Wall cautions that Bell’s proposition could be used 
as a neo-imperialist tool to allow for third party involvement to reconfigure states in a mode 
which is judged more suitable to democratic ends.
138
 It is necessary for Bell to establish more 
definitively the parameters of third party involvement, though this does not undermine the 
overall cohesiveness of her argument.  
Bell argues that from the scale of peace agreements a large number of common trends appear 
to create a law of the peacemaker that is discernable, autonomous and that stands as a 
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reasonable alternative to domestic law that may be considered partisan or international law 
and is stymied by the Westphalian order.
139
 This common body of law creates a cosmopolitan 
order which is symptomatic of a new law. The participation of third parties in this process is 
an integral facet of this new order.  
VI. Does understanding Good Offices through the lens of lex pacificatoria 
offer a better understanding of its nature 
 
Good offices may, with some qualifications, be a good exemplar of Bell’s lex. Good offices 
in the milieu of conflict resolution certainly fit within the narrative proposed by Bell. The rise 
of peace agreements and the patterns of resolution which are central to Bell’s lex, are 
discussed in this section to attempt to decipher whether good offices is a model for the 
application of the lex or if it only partially explains its character. As Bell’s lex only applies to 
violent conflicts it can only be this aspect of good offices where it is relevant. This leaves a 
large swath of good offices still bereft of a contextual analysis. The work undertaken within 
international administrative law may offer some opportunity for understanding good offices 
in its broader context.
140
  
Arguably Bell’s description of the re-emergence of a non-Westphalian view of treaty law 
since the Cold War is both undermined and reinforced by the practice of good offices.
141
 
Certainly state-led good offices come within the traditional account of international law; 
however, the roles played by the heads of organisations herald a move away from the state.
142
 
These actors in international law have presented themselves as independent of both the 
participants in the conflict and their organisations. This is epitomised by the activities of the 
UN Secretaries General in Cyprus and South America, where the office has acted not to 
represent any particular sovereign view but rather to establish peace.
143
 
The three characteristics of peace agreements outlined by Bell; local and global, hybrid and 
process and substance, are identifiably as attributes of the type of settlements which have 
resulted from good offices. The local implications of good offices coupled with the global 
impact of their use are evident in the examples already discussed. Though importantly, in the 
historical context, these were undertaken within a Westphalian understanding of the role of 
peacemakers. Yet the hybridity of the law as outlined by Bell is evident in the actions 
undertaken, predominantly by the UN Secretary General, in good offices.  
The examples of peace monitoring agreements, the Commonwealth’s solely intra-state 
involvement, the Annan Plan, among other examples, present difficulties for the state-led 
understanding of international law.
144
 The involvement with non-state actors, the domestic 
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constitutional implications of the actions undertaken, alongside the mainly international 
actors who are using their good offices to resolve the dispute, makes the hybridity presented 
by Bell attractive as a concept. It helps to unravel the parameters in which good offices are 
understood as it focuses upon the nature of the conflict and not on the actors, as domestic or 
international. 
The fears that are expressed by Lang regarding unenforceability are not easily observable 
within good offices.
145
 This may be due to the associated responsive form that good offices 
takes which often means that whether the resulting agreement has been enforceable under 
international law has been a consideration or at least has rarely been litigated.
146
 Nonetheless, 
if this is the case it does not allay Lang’s more general concerns. Yet, as has already been 
discussed, hybridity does not result in soft law and nor it is contended here, does good 
offices. The idea that this lex is both process and substance does resonate with good offices. 
In operation the adaptable nature of good offices allows it to be at once or alternatively both 
process and substance and as such adapt the changing parameters of the conflict. 
Bell’s argument that third parties may be both external and self guarantors as well as norm 
promoters certainly comes within good offices’ remit and is recognisable as central to the role 
that good offices fulfil. Good offices tend to come within a legalised framework either as part 
of the treaty or an institutional system, for example the UN. In presenting good offices as part 
of the lex any attempts to understand it purely as an international phenomenon may be 
abandoned. Two aspects of Bell’s lex will be central to this; hybridity together with process 
and substance. The strength of good offices lies in its ability to adapt. This, however, should 
not eschew the legitimisation that is important particularly in constitutionalisation, 
dislocation of power and state re-definition that takes place during conflict resolution.
147
 
Though it is questionable whether the legitimacy suggested by Bell can be achieved solely 
through these two elements combined, it does go some way to explain the character of peace 
settlement.  
Even prior to the end of the Cold War, which both Bell and Franck consider to be an essential 
turning point in conflict resolution, in Afghanistan or South America certain good offices 
operations had already focused on non-state actors.
148
 These direct talks tend to use broadly 
similar methods that do appear to resonate with the pattern which Bell suggests is emerging. 
Though the publication of the outcomes belies what De Cuéllar described as ‘quiet 
diplomacy’ the more recent transparency, for example in Cyprus, does suggest that it may be 
emerging from the shadows.
149
 The patterns which have developed over the past 60 years 
have set the confines of good offices and this may be paralleled in the patterns of peace 
agreements which as Bell suggests have begun materialize as a coherent model. 
Arguably the introduction of Bell’s lex to good offices would sit comfortably within the 
legalisation of international relations and more particular institutional relations that since the 
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end of the Cold War has become apparent.
150
 Bell’s discussion of legalisation and compliance 
raises questions of the relative utility of this process within good offices. What possibly can 
be gained from attributing a legal framework to a form of conflict resolution which, as 
already demonstrated, has functioned successfully and perhaps better than it otherwise would 
have due to its lack of legalised structure? One answer is that as good offices develops into 
taking more domestic constitutional roles as well as its non-statist approach than has 
previously been the case it makes it now incumbent upon it and the actors involved to partake 
in a legitimised structure which neither international or domestic law wholly provide.  
There are aspects of good offices are left unanswered by the lex. As practitioners of good 
offices, what are the specific actions that they may or may not take? If it is entirely an 
internal dispute are they domestic actors or does the presence of such actors internationalise 
the conflict, if they become signatories or monitors of peace agreements do they thus take on 
constitutional positions and what of the conflicting obligations of the institutions that the 
heads of organisations represent. These issues raise uncertainties as to the question of 
legitimacy which third parties must face as interlocutors or alternatively as constitutional 
actors within a legal classification of any kind. Questions of ownership can be particularly 
difficult in processes that include third parties. Authority for third party involvement may 
fluctuate due to changes in parties, the state, addition of other actors or other similar factors 
and this should not be underestimated as a dynamic aspect of the approach of peacemakers to 
their charge.
 151
 As Bell acknowledges third party involvement may result in notions of 
positive social change also in imperialist or neo-colonial interpretations.
152
 The Peking 
Formula is one manner in which the UN Secretary General has sought to distance himself 
from the condemnation of the Security Council, but this action may be equivocal in achieving 
distance from accusations of hegemony.
153
  
The pattern of conflict resolution which, particularly the UN Secretary General, has been 
setting can certainly be characterised as hybrid, the implications of their roles can be local 
and global, in which the third party actors are characterised by their position as non-state 
international actors whose legal role is nebulous at best. Bell’s lex describes a landscape of 
conflict resolution which good offices comfortably fits within. While leaving a lot of 
questions open to further discussion it presents a cohesive method of tackling some of the 
issues which good offices, as an unregulated form of conflict resolution, has produced 
particularly since the advent of the non-state actor as the driving force behind it.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Good offices operates as a distinct form of conflict resolution. As a form of conflict 
resolution that is defined by who is undertaking the office as opposed to the form it takes, it is 
set apart from other forms of conflict management. Its lack of legalised characteristics has 
allowed it to evolve into a dynamic form of conflict management. The qualities that have 
emerged as integral to its operation, ability to evolve alongside the conflict, the international 
actor as a central figure in its process, the involvement in the entirety of a conflict from prior 
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to the descent into violence to potentially long after it has ended, presents good offices as a 
core part of third party management of conflicts. What Bell’s lex offers is a source of analysis 
to understand the parameters of good offices where traditional international and domestic law 
categories are insufficient and do not allow for a cohesive analysis.  
Bell’s lex establishes a structure within which conflict resolution and management is 
understood, not as either an arm of international or domestic law but rather as a discipline 
with its own principles that is best understood in its own right. As Wall argues, Bell’s 
proposal incorporates aspects of jurisprudence that are not often considered integral to 
understanding the nature of international or domestic law.
154
 While certain aspects of the 
substance and process structure, for example, are not as yet fully developed, as it stands, 
Bell’s lex is a sound basis under which to conduct a more ordered and coherent analysis of 
good offices. The pattern that has developed over the past century and identified by Bell, can 
readily be recognised in good offices and the lex provides at least an opportunity to readily 
discuss these issues. 
Good offices can no longer meander between conflicts without questions of legitimisation 
and legalisation being raised. It is, at times, suggested that transparency and analysis would 
constrain the actions of those who seek bring about pacific settlement through good offices, 
but this does not outweigh the need for legitimacy.
155
 The pattern that is described by Bell 
requires third parties that become involved in constitutional settlement and the dislocation of 
power good offices to at the very least be considered a large player in the conflict 
management arena. In broader arguments regarding global legal governance, the place of 
such legitimisation structures is vital, though good offices may still be left relying on certain 
institutions and processes to provide this foundation.  
In the evolving background of conflict resolution and management good offices has emerged 
as central to the processes employed to bring about the end of violent conflict. Good offices 
has moved from the purview of states, to international institutional actors to the current 
activities of the Elders or indeed Tony Blair. As long as this evolution continues the 
inadequacies of the legal investigation into the structures behind good offices will lead only 
to accusations of illegitimacy and ultimately that international actors, such as the UN 
Secretary General, are acting outside of their remit. At the very least Bell has provided a 
framework in which at least some of the problems that have been thrown up by the practice 
of good offices can be debated in a coherent and constructive manner.  
                                                          
154
 Wall ‘On the threshold of Law: On the Law of Peace’  
155
 UN Secretary General. De Cuéllar described good offices as, ‘quiet diplomacy’, Adams & Kingsbury United 
Nations 133 
